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Abstract
We present a regularized logistic regression model for evaluating player contribu-
tions in hockey. The traditional metric for this purpose is the plus-minus statistic,
which allocates a single unit of credit (for or against) to each player on the ice for
a goal. However, plus-minus scores measure only the marginal effect of players, do
not account for sample size, and provide a very noisy estimate of performance. We
investigate a related regression problem: what does each player on the ice contribute,
beyond aggregate team performance and other factors, to the odds that a given goal
was scored by their team? Due to the large-p (number of players) and imbalanced de-
sign setting of hockey analysis, a major part of our contribution is a careful treatment
of prior shrinkage in model estimation. We showcase two recently developed techniques
– for posterior maximization or simulation – that make such analysis feasible. Each
approach is accompanied with publicly available software and we include the simple
commands used in our analysis. Our results show that most players do not stand out
as measurably strong (positive or negative) contributors. This allows the stars to really
shine, reveals diamonds in the rough overlooked by earlier analyses, and argues that
some of the highest paid players in the league are not making contributions worth their
expense.
Key words: Logistic Regression, Regularization, Lasso, Bayesian Shrinkage, Sports
Analytics
1 Introduction
Player performance in hockey is difficult to quantify due to the continuity of play, frequent
line changes, and the infrequency of goals. Historically, the primary measure of individual
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skater performance has been the plus-minus value: the number of goals scored by a player’s
team minus the number of goals scored by the opposing team while that player is on the ice.
More complex measures of player performance have been proposed to take into account
game data beyond goal scoring, such as hits or face-offs. Examples include the adjusted
minus/plus probability approach of Schuckers et al. (2010) and indices such as Corsi and
DeltaSOT, as reviewed by Vollman (2010). Unfortunately, analysts do not generally agree
on the relative importance of the added information. While it is possible to statistically infer
additional variable effects in a probability model for team performance (Thomas et al., 2012)
our experience is that, in the low-scoring world of hockey, such high-dimensional estimation
relies heavily upon model assumptions that are difficult to validate. As a result, complex
scores provide an interesting new source of commentary but have yet to be adopted as
consensus performance metrics or as a basis for decision making.
Due to its simplicity, the plus-minus remains the most popular measure of player perfor-
mance. It has been logged for the past fifty years and is easy to calculate from the current
resolution of available game data, which consists of the identities of each player on the ice
at any time point of the game as well as the times when goals were scored. However, a key
weakness is that the plus-minus for each player does not just depend on their individual
ability but also on other factors, most obviously the abilities of teammates and opponents.
In statistical terms, plus-minus is a marginal effect : it is an aggregate measure that
averages over the contributions of opponents and teammates. Since the quality of the pool
of teammates and opponents that each player is matched with on-ice can vary dramatically,
the marginal plus-minus for individual players are inherently polluted. Another disadvantage
is that plus-minus does not control for sample size, such that players with limited ice-time
will have high variance scores that soar or sink depending on a few chance plays.
A better measure of performance would be the partial effect of each player, having con-
trolled for the contributions of teammates, opponents and possibly other variables. To this
end, we propose a logistic regression model to estimate the credit or blame that should be
apportioned to each player when a goal is scored. In keeping with the spirit of plus-minus
(and using the same publicly available data), we focus on the list of players on the ice for
each goal as our basic unit of analysis. Briefly, denote by qi the probability that a given goal
‘i’ was scored by the home team (home and away are just organizational devices; results are
unchanged upon modeling p(away) instead). Then
log
(
qi
1− qi
)
= αi + βhi1 + . . .+ βhi6 − βai1 . . .− βai6 , (1)
where β = [β1 · · · βnp ]′ is the vector of partial plus-minus effects for each of np players in our
sample, with {hi1 . . . hi6} and {ai1 . . . ai6} being the indices on β corresponding to home-team
(h) and away-team (a) players on the ice for goal i.1 The intercept term αi can depend upon
additional covariates, e.g. the model we present in Section 2.2 incorporates team indicators
into αi.
1Note that we include goalies in our analysis.
2
In almost all regressions, one is susceptible to the twin problems of over-fit, where pa-
rameters are optimized to statistical noise rather than fit to the relationship of interest,
and multicollinearity, where groups of covariates are correlated with each other making it
difficult to identify individual effects. These issues are especially prominent in analysis of
hockey, with a high dimensional covariate set (around 1500 players in our sample) and a very
imbalanced experiment design – due to use of player lines, wherein groups of 2-3 players are
consistently on ice together at the same time, the data contain many clusters of individuals
who are seldom observed apart.
A crucial contribution of our paper is a careful treatment of the partial player effects β
that helps alleviate both problems. As outlined in Section 2.2, a prior distribution with its
mode at the origin is placed on each βj; this adds a penalty – e.g., λjβ
2
j or λj|βj| – on the
likelihood function and shrinks estimates of this coefficient towards zero. We use the term
regularization to refer to the shrinkage of regression coefficients towards zero that is induced
by our prior distribution.
Building on new developments in regularized estimation for regression with binary re-
sponse (such as our home-vs-away outcome), we leverage machinery that has only very
recently become available for data sets of the size encountered in our analysis. In particular,
we detail penalized likelihood maximization for fast robust estimates of player contribution,
as well as Bayesian simulation for exploring joint uncertainty in multiple player effects, al-
lowing for comparisons between groups of players which would not have been possible with
earlier methodology. In both cases, inference proceeds through simple commands to newly
developed packages for the open source R analysis software (R Development Core Team,
2010). The resulting player effects are easy to interpret, and our hope is that readers will
experiment with our models to feed a discussion on alternative plus-minus metrics.
The remainder of the paper is outlined as follows. Section 1.1 provides an overview of
previous attempts at a partial player affect. These avoid full-scale logistic regression which,
until very recently, would not have been computationally feasible. Section 2 details our data
and general regression model. Section 3 presents point estimates of player effects, comparing
results both with and without controlling for teams and under a range of levels of prior
regularization. These regularized point estimates can be used for variable selection, since
only a subset of effects will be non-zero. Section 4 then describes a full Bayesian analysis
of the joint uncertainty about players, and illustrates how such information can be used by
coaches and general managers to make important personnel decisions. The paper concludes
in Section 5 with a discussion, and an appendix which contains details of our estimation
algorithms and the entertainment of a full interaction model.
1.1 Background on Adjusted Plus-Minus
The strategy of conditional estimation for player ability is not new to sports analysis. For
example, Awad (2009) advocates a simple adjustment to hockey plus-minus that controls
for team strength by subtracting team-average plus-minus. Basketball analysts have been
active with conditional performance models, including the linear regressions employed by
Rosenbaum (2004) and Ilardi and Barzilai (2004). Due to frequent scoring and variability
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in the combination of players on the floor, estimation of partial effects is generally easier in
basketball than in the low scoring and imbalanced design setting of hockey.
For hockey, Macdonald (2010) proposes analysis of the relationship between players and
goals through regression models similar to those used in basketball. He tracks the length
of time on ice and goals scored in each of around 8×105 “shifts” – unique combinations of
players – to build a goals-per-hour response that is regressed onto player effect variables
analogous to our β in (1). While Macdonald’s work is related to ours, as both are regressing
scoring onto player presence, we outline several distinctions between the approaches which
are helpful in understanding the motivation behind our modeling.
The use of shift-time (regardless of whether a goal was scored) introduces extra informa-
tion but also leads to questions on data quality and model specification. For example, we
find a median actual shift length of eight seconds, such that the recorded total time-on-ice
for unique player combinations is built from pieces that may be too small for play to develop
or be assessed. The average goals-per-shift is around 0.02 such that less than 2% of the
sampled response is nonzero. This calls into doubt the assumption of approximate normal-
ity upon which Macdonald’s standard error estimates are based. Moreover, although there
are more observations in the sample than there are covariates, a vast majority of scoreless
shifts implies that least-squares estimation is dominated by a few scoring shifts. Even with a
more balanced sample, estimation on this dimension is likely overfit without regularization.
Indeed, Macdonald reports only top skaters among those with at least 700 minutes on ice;
we suspect that players with very little ice time dominate the full list of effects.
2 Data and Model
This section details our data, the full regression model, and prior specification.
2.1 Data
The data, downloaded from www.nhl.com, comprise of information about the teams play-
ing (with home/away indicators), and the players on ice (including goalies) for every even
strength goal during the four regular seasons of 2007–2008 through 2010–2011. There were
np = 1467 players involved in ng = 18154 goals. In keeping with the canonical definition
of plus-minus, we do not consider power-play/shorthanded or overtime goals; however, our
framework is easily extended to handle such data.
This article focuses on the 4-season data aggregate and treats player ability as constant
over this range. The larger data window allows for better effect measurement, especially
due to the increased variation in on-ice configuration and player movement between teams.
However, different aggregations will be desirable for different situations and one can apply
our methods to any subset. Given a data window that is too short for measurement of
individual ability, our sparse estimation methods will simply set all player effects to zero.
The data are arranged into a response vector Y and a design matrix X comprising of
two parts, XT and XP , for indicator variables corresponding to team and player identities
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respectively. For each goal i the response vector contains yi = 1 for goals scored by the home
team and yi = −1 for away team goals. The corresponding ith row of X indicates the teams
playing and the players on the ice when that goal was scored, with xT ij equal to 1 for the
home team and xPij equal to 1 for each home player on the ice, and xT ij equal to −1 for
the away team and xPij equal to −1 for each away player on the ice. All other xT ij and xPij
indicators are equal to zero. Figure 1 illustrates this data structure with two example rows.
xTij 2 { 1, 0, 1},
30X
j=1
xTij = 0,
30X
j=1
|xTij | = 2
0 1 0 · · · 0  1 0
0  1  1 0 0 1 0 0 1  1 0 1 0 · · · 0  1 0 1 0 1 0  1 0 0 1  1 0
0 1 1 0 0  1 0 0  1 1 0  1 0 · · · 0 1 0  1 0 1 0 1 0 0  1 1 0
0  1 0 · · · 0 1 0
...
...
...
1 130
XT : teams
XP : players
Y : scoring team
xPij 2 { 1, 0, 1},
nPX
j=1
xPij = 0,
nPX
j=1
|xPij | = 12
nP
yi 2 { 1, 1}
1
 1
Figure 1: A diagram of the design matrix and two example rows. Two goals are shown under the same
configuration of teams and players, except that the home team has scored in the first case and the visiting
team in the second (so that the two rows have opposite parity). Exactly two teams have nonzero entries and
exactly twelve players (six home, six away) are nonzero in each row.
Note that the design matrix is extremely sparse: overall dimensions are ng × (np + 30) =
18154 × 1497, but every row has 1485 zeros for more than 99% sparsity. As already noted,
the design is also highly imbalanced: only about 27K of the greater than one million possible
player pairs are actually observed on the ice for a goal.
2.2 Logistic Likelihood Model
From the data definition of 2.1, we can reformulate our logistic regression equation of (1) as
log
(
qi
1− qi
)
= x′T iα+ x
′
Piβ (2)
where qi = p(yi = 1), xPi = [xPi1 · · ·xPinp ]′ is the vector corresponding to the ith row of
XP , xT i is similarly the i
th row of XT , α is the length-30 vector of team effects and β is the
length-np vector of player effects.
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The likelihood model in (2) is easily extended to incorporate additional conditioning
information or more flexible player-effect specifications. For example, xT i and α could be
lengthened to account for special teams effects (e.g., including variables to indicate penalties
or other non-five-on-five situations) or potential sources of bias (e.g., referee indicators).
Moreover, xPi and β could be doubled in length to include distinct offensive and defensive
player effects, as in Ilardi and Barzilai (2004). We focus on the current formulation to stay
true to the spirit of the standard plus-minus metric, although we do investigate a model with
pairwise interactions between players in Appendix B.
2.3 Bayesian Approach and Prior Regularization
We impose shrinkage on our regression coefficients by taking a Bayesian approach that
combines our logistic likelihood model (2) with a prior distribution centered at zero. The
general Bayesian approach consists of a likelihood p(y|θ) model that specifies the observed
data as a function of unknown parameters θ and a prior distribution p(θ) for them. In
this particular application, the unknown parameters θ are the team partial effects α and
player partial effects β. Inference in the Bayesian approach is based the posterior distribu-
tion p(θ|y) ∝ p(y|θ) × p(θ). In a full Bayesian analysis, the entire posterior distribution is
estimated, usually via simulation-based methods such as Markov chain Monte Carlo. Al-
ternatively, we can restrict ourselves to the maximum a posteriori (MAP) estimates of the
unknown parameters.
Imposing a prior distribution on the regression coefficients of our logistic model (2) is
necessary to guard from overfit and provide stable estimates of individual player effects. To
emphasize this point, consider an attempt at maximum likelihood estimation for the simplest
non-team-effect model (x′T iα replaced by shared α). Fitting the standard logistic regression
model2 yields a half hour wait and several numerical errors. Forward step-wise regression3
is not a solution: it takes hours to converge on a model with only three significant players.
Using prior distributions pi(αj) and pi(βj) for each model parameter adds stability to the
fitted model by shrinking each coefficient towards a central value of zero. From the perspec-
tive of point estimation, placing a prior distribution on βj (or αj equivalently) centered at
zero is equivalent to adding a penalty term for βj 6= 0 in the objective function that is being
optimized to give us point estimates for each βj.
Different types of prior distributions correspond to different penalty functions on βj 6= 0.
One common strategy uses a normal prior distribution (centered at zero) on each βj which
corresponds to a L2 penalty (λjβ
2
j ) in the objective function. Thus, the MAP estimates
from a Bayesian regression model with a normal prior distribution are equivalent to the
estimates from ridge regression (Hoerl and Kennard, 1970). A normal prior distribution (L2
penalization) is used under an assumption that every covariate has a limited effect on the
response, i.e. elements of β are non-zero but small.
Another popular strategy uses a Laplace prior distribution on each βj which corresponds
2 Fitted in R using the command: fit <- glm(goals ∼ XP, family="binomial")
3We used forward step-wise regression with the Bayes information criterion (BIC)
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to a L1 penalty (λj|βj|) in the objective function. Thus, the MAP estimates from a Bayesian
regression model with a Laplace prior distribution are equivalent to the estimates from lasso
regression (Tibshirani, 1996). A Laplace prior distribution yields a penalized point estimate
of exactly βj = 0 in the absence of strong evidence, and non-zero βj for only a subset of
significant variables. In this way, using an L1 penalty naturally permits variable selection
where only a subset of covariates are selected as having substantive predictive effects on the
outcome variable.
We favor an L1 penalty/Laplace prior for player effects β because it permits variable
selection: the identification of players that stand out as having truly substantive effect. We
also employ a L2 penalty/normal prior for coefficients on “nuisance” variables, such as the
team effects α. L1 and L2 penalties are fairly standard choices for sparse and dense models
respectively: L2 has a long history in Tikhonov regularization and ridge regression, while L1
has a shorter history but wide usage in Lasso estimation. The focus on influential players
yielded by coefficient sparsity is key to our analysis and exposition, while dense estimation is
a more conservative choice for the controlling variables since it does not assume their effect
can be represented in a lower dimensional subspace (results are practically unchanged if one
uses L1 regularization for the team effects).
For completeness, we summarize here that this combination of L1 and L2 penalty terms
is built into our Bayesian model by imposing the following prior densities on our regression
coefficients,
pi(α,β) =
30∏
t=1
N(αt; 0, σ
2
t )
np∏
j=1
Laplace(βj;λj). (3)
We begin our analysis by investigating the maximum a posteriori (MAP) estimates of α
and β in Section 3. We then explore the full posterior distribution of our regularized logistic
regression model in Section 4. Specification of prior parameters σt and λj dictates the amount
of penalization imposed on estimates, and each analysis section outlines its approach and
sensitivity to this choice. In particular, our MAP estimation jointly optimizes over both
the coefficients and their penalty, while the fully Bayesian analysis averages player effects
over possible values of a single shared penalty. Full estimation algorithms and software
description are in Appendix A.
3 Point Estimates of Player Contribution
This section presents MAP point estimates for β, the player contribution partial effects,
under the regression in (2) with priors in (3). Team-effect prior variances are fixed at
σt = 1, giving a standard normal prior specification. Due to the large amount of likelihood
information on team effects, our results are largely insensitive to the value of σt.
The Laplace prior parameters λj for our player effects require more care. We place an
additional hyperprior distribution on the λj parameters so that the data can help us infer
these penalty parameters along with their coefficients. The term hyperprior is used for
parameters such as λj that are themselves involved in the prior distributions of our main
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Figure 2: Comparing main effects for players in the team-augmented model (dots), to the player-only
model. The lines point to the unconditional (player-only) estimates. The coefficients have been ordered by
the dots. Players discussed in the text have their names colored in red. Players with coefficients estimated
as zero under both models are not shown.
parameters of interest (player effects β). A model with several levels of unknown parameters
(and prior distributions) is often called a Bayesian hierarchical model.
Following Taddy (2013), independent conjugate gamma prior distributions are assumed
for each λj with var[λj] = 2 × E[λj]. Throughout Section 3.1 we use E[λj] = 15 which was
smallest penalty we could manage while eliminating large nonzero βj for players with very
little ice time. Note also that posterior samples for a shared L1 penalty λ are obtained as
a byproduct of the full Bayesian analysis in Section 4. The inferred posterior mean E[λ] is
again around 15, further justifying a MAP estimation centered on this value.
Details of our model implementation are given in Appendix A. Section 3.2 offers a com-
parison to traditional plus-minus, and a sensitivity analysis for the prior parametrization is
given in Section 3.3. We conclude by augmenting with salary information in Section 3.4 in
order to comment on player value-for-money.
3.1 MAP Estimation of Partial Player Effects
We consider two models for conditional player effect estimation: the full team-player model
of (2) and a player-only model, where x′T iα is replaced by a single shared parameter α.
Figure 2 shows the main effects obtained for the team–player model under MAP estimation
(dots), and compares to those from a player-only model (connecting lines). Only players with
non-zero effects in either model are shown. The x-axis orders the players by their estimates
in the team–player model, expressing a marginal ordering on player ability.
Observe that incorporating team effects causes many more player effects to be zeroed
out, with many players’ stand-out performance being absorbed by their respective teams
(red lines tracking to zero). Note that ability estimates for players who frequently share the
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ice will generally be negatively correlated: if players are always on the ice together when a
goal is scored, an increase in the estimated effect of one player must be accompanied by a
decrease in the effect of the other player. In MAP estimation under a sparsity-inducing L1
penalty, this will often manifest itself by forcing one players effect being estimated at zero.
Perhaps the most surprising result is that Sidney Crosby, considered by many to be the
best player in the NHL, has a contribution that drops after accounting for his team (although
he still stands out). Jonathan Toews’ and Zdeno Chara’s effects show similar behavior, the
latter having no player–team effect. As all three players captain their respective (consistently
competitive) teams, we should perhaps not be surprised that team success is so tightly
coupled to player success in these cases.
An exception is Pavel Datsyuk, who stands out as the leagues very best, having a coeffi-
cient that is unmoved even after considering the strong team effect of his Red Wings. There
are also a few players, such as Dwayne Roloson, who shine despite their team. Roloson has
a strong positive effect in the player–team model but a null one in the player-only model.
We will revisit this particular result in Section 3.2.
On the negative side, Colton Orr and Stephane Veilleux seem to shoulder undue blame
for their team’s poor performance. Orr, recognized as an enforcer when on the ice, may
not have been used effectively by his coaching staff. Veilleux played alongside Gaborik on
the Wild in the late 2000s, and both players get a positive bump in the player–team model.
Finally, Craig Adams and Radek Bonk stand out as poor performers in both models.
3.2 Comparison to traditional plus-minus
Our variable selection approach provides a rich but compact summary of player perfor-
mance. In our team-player model with an L1 penalty, the vast majority of players obtain
a “mediocre” βˆj = 0 and our focus can be narrowed to those who have a significant partial
effect on scoring. In contrast, plus-minus assigns a non-zero number for most players without
any reference to statistical significance. Thus the most obvious departure from traditional
plus-minus is that far fewer players are distinguishable from their team-average under our
performance metric.
From the model equation in (1), nonzero partial player estimates are an additive effect on
the log odds that, given a goal has been scored, it is a goal for that player’s team (controlling
for team and the other players). In other words, eβj is a multiplier on the for-vs-against odds
for every goal where player j is on the ice, so that our parameters β relate multiplicatively to
the ratio of for-vs-against, while traditional plus-minus is calculated as the difference between
for-vs-against goals. Moreover, our partial effects measure deviations in performance from
the team average so that a player on a very good team needs to be even better than his
teammates to gain a positive β, while an average player on a good team has an impressive
plus-minus measure just by keeping up.
Despite these differences, both metrics are an attempt to quantify player contribution.
Figure 3 compares our MAP estimates of player partial effects from the team-player model
to the traditional plus-minus aggregated over our four seasons of data. The left-hand plot
shows the player estimates, labeled by positional information.
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T.B −0.165 −159
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Figure 3: Left: Comparing plus-minus, aggregated over the four seasons considered in our analysis, to the
MAP partial effects βˆ. Plot symbols give positional information: C = center, L = left wing, R = right wing,
D = defense, and G = goalie. Right: Comparing team partial effects αˆ to their plus-minus values.
Discrepancies between the two metrics in Figure 3 are informative. One player, Dwayne
Roloson, has a plus-minus whose sign disagrees with that on his βˆj. We also noted earlier
that Roloson has a partial player effect that is pulled up in the team–player model compared
to the player-only model. For an explanation, we can examine the αˆj coefficients of the
teams which appear in the table on the right-panel of Figure 3. Each of the four teams
Roloson played for (T.B, NYI, EDM, and MIN) all have significantly negative αˆj values.
Apparently Roloson was a quantifiable star on a string of poorly performing teams. Our
model reasonably attributes many of the goals counting against him in his traditional plus-
minus as counting against his team as a whole.
Another observation from Figure 3 is that our model estimates disagree with traditional
plus-minus about who is the best player in hockey. Alex Ovechkin is the player with the
largest plus-minus value, although there are nearly a dozen other players with plus-minus
values are within ten percent of his. In contrast, Pavel Datsyuk is the best player according
to our partial player effects by a huge margin: his posterior odds of contributing to a goal
for his team are nearly 50% larger than the next best players (Ovechkin and Gaborik).
The second best player in hockey by traditional plus-minus is Roberto Luongo. However,
from Figure 2, we see that Luongo’s partial player estimate is βˆj = 0. In the context of a
goalie, the implication is that his play is not significantly different from that of his back-
ups on the Vancouver Canucks. This suggests that undue blame and credit may have been
placed on Luongo for both regular season successes and postseason collapses. At the other
end, observe that the best ranked player with a negative partial player estimate (Michael
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Figure 4: Coefficient estimates for a subset of players (chosen from all players with nonzero coefficients at
E[λj ] = 15, our specification in Sections 3.1-2). The expected L1 penalty is shown along the bottom, with
corresponding % of estimated βj 6= 0 along the top and coefficient value on the right.
Del Zotto) has a nearly-zero plus-minus value.
3.3 Prior sensitivity analysis
MAP estimates for each βj are sensitive to E[λj], the expected L1 penalty for each coeffi-
cient. This relationship is illustrated in Figure 4, which shows estimated coefficients under
increasing penalty for some players with large effects in Sections 3.1-2. We see that as the
expected value of the penalty term grows, the number of non-zero players (top X-axis of Fig-
ure 4) decreases substantially, which illustrates the variable selection aspect of our model.
The magnitudes of the MAP estimates of partial player effects βj are also shrunk towards
zero with larger penalties.
The far left values have a very low E[λj] = 1/10 and non-zero βˆj for 98% of players.
At this extreme, there are three plotted players with stronger effect than Datsyuk. Only
Zach Parise is more effective than Datsyuk at E[λj] = 2, which leads to 56% of players with
non-zero effects. At E[λj] = 4, Datsyuk is the top player and 36% of players have non-zero
effects. Datsyuk remains the best player at very high penalization levels, until he is the only
measurable contributor in the league.
More dramatic changes can be found in the (un-plotted) estimates for players with rela-
tively low ice-time. As an example, Michel Ouellet is among the top estimated performers
in the league for E[λj] < 10, but he jumps to a zero βˆj under higher penalties. Given this
sensitivity, it is worth revisiting hyperprior specification. Although we have chosen E[λj]
with help from results of Section 4, this value was also only slightly higher than where
11
non-star players (e.g., Ouellet) drop out of the top βˆj rankings. In the absence of reliable
out-of-sample testing, one pragmatic option is to increase penalty until the results become
unrealistic. Similarly, one can interpret estimates conditional on the number of nonzero co-
efficients, and consider the βˆj as performance measured under a given level of sparsity. A
better approach, however, is to nearly eliminate sensitivity to the prior by averaging over
penalty uncertainty, as we do in Section 4.
3.4 Value for money
In the left of Figure 5, we plot MAP βˆ estimates from our model versus 2010-11 salaries for
the non-zero coefficients. Plus-minus points (rescaled to fall into the same range) have also
been added to the left plot.
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Figure 5: The left plot shows non-zero MAP βˆ estimates versus 2010-11 salary, augmented with rescaled
plus-minus points for comparison. Ordinary least squares fits are added to aid in visualization. The right
plot shows the histogram of 2010-11 salaries for players with βˆj = 0, extending to the full set in gray.
The lines overlaid on the left plot are ordinary least squares fits for each metric; a
hypothesis test for the interaction coefficient reveals that indeed the two lines differ (at the
5% level; p = 0.026). Since the βj relate to performance on a log scale, as is typically
assumed for salary, we are not surprised to see a linear relationship between salary and our
player effects. The fact that the standard errors for the βˆ fit (0.1226) is less than the plus-
minus fit (0.1605) with the same design inputs suggests that our model-based player effects
βˆ have greater correlation to player salary. Teams appear to be compensating their players
using strategies that are more in line with our partial player effects (β) than with traditional
plus-minus.
One reason why our model estimates have a lesser slope with salary is that fewer players
are estimated to have a substantial (non-zero) negative contribution by our model compared
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to traditional plus-minus. Despite the decent correlation between our model estimates and
player salary, it is also clear that there are some mis-priced players. The best player according
to our model, Pavel Datsyuk, probably deserves a raise whereas Sidney Crosby may be
somewhat over-priced. Alex Ovechkin seems to be correctly priced in the sense that he is
close to the fitted line between his model estimate and his salary.
In the right of Figure 5, we give the salary distribution for players that were estimated
to have zero player effects. Clearly, there are many players with high salaries but which
are estimated by our model to not have a substantial player effect. Specifically, the top ten
salaries for players with βˆj = 0 are Chris Pronger ($7.6M), Henrik Zetterberg ($7.75M),
Brad Richards ($7.8M), Marian Hossa ($7.9M), Chris Drury ($8M), Scott Gomez ($8M),
Duncan Keith ($9M), Evgeni Malkin ($10M), and Vincent Lecavalier ($10M).
The gray extensions to the histogram indicate the full salary distribution, including
players where βˆj 6= 0. With the exception of the bins containing the largest salaries, the
absolute tally of βˆj 6= 0 players is fairly uniform. It is somewhat surprising that a relatively
large proportion of top-dollar players find themselves with player effects of zero.
4 Full Posterior Estimation and Decision Making
The full posterior distribution from our penalized logistic regression model was estimated
via Markov-Chain Monte Carlo simulation, with details given in Appendix A. We will first
use the full posterior distribution to re-examine our player effects βj while accounting for
possible covariance between players. We will then consider additional salary information to
explore optimal line combinations and matchups under budget constraints in Section 4.2.
Neither of these analyses is possible without samples from the full posterior distribution.
4.1 Posterior Analysis of Team–player Model
In contrast with the MAP estimates from Section 3, samples from the full posterior distri-
bution do not easily emit a variable selection. However, these posterior samples do contain
much richer information about relative player ability via the covariance structure of the β.
One way of analyzing this information is by constructing a matrix with the posterior prob-
ability that each player is better than every other player. Specifically, for each player pair
(i, j), we calculate the proportion of samples where β
(t)
i is larger than β
(t)
j .
As an example, Figure 6 shows three players (Datsyuk, Roloson, and Marchant), pitting
each of them against the 90-odd players with non-zero MAP estimates under the team–player
model. Comparisons under both the team–player and player-only models are provided. Note
that the x-axis has been slightly re-ordered by the posterior mean in the team–player model
to make the corresponding curves smoother.
Observe how Roloson’s curves indicate a large discrepancy under the team-player and
player-only models (since he played well with poor teams), whereas Datsyuk’s and Marchant’s
show negligible differences. We are not aware of any other player effect that can be exam-
ined (pairwise or otherwise) at this resolution, and on such readily-interpretable probabilistic
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Figure 6: Comparing the ability of Datsyuk (black), Roloson (red), and Marchant (green) to the 90-odd
other players with non-zero coefficients in either the team–player or player-only models. These three players
are also indicated in red among the list of players on the X-axis. Thicker lines correspond to the team–player
model.
terms.
4.2 Posterior Player Match-ups and Line Optimization
Beyond examining pairwise differences, another way to explore our full posterior results is
through match-ups and line combinations based on the posterior predictive distribution that
accounts for covariances among our set of players. Later, we will also build in external
constraints in the form of a cap on salaries.
Specifically, we will calculate the posterior probability that one particular configuration
of players (line A) is more likely to score or be scored upon when facing another configura-
tion (line B). This type of calculation would allow coaches to explore specific line match-ups
against opponents. In these match-ups, team information will be ignored but position infor-
mation respected: we construct only six-on-six match-ups with one goalie, center, left-wing,
right-wing, and two defensemen on each side.
Consider the following four analyses, where we use our posterior results to either: 1. pit
the best players against the worst players, 2. pit the best players against random players,
3. pit random players against the worst players, and 4. pit random players against other
random players. When pitting the best against the worst we construct the input x(t) for
each sample β(t) as follows. Place 1’s in slots for players in each position with the largest
β(t) value, and −1’s in those with the smallest (largest negative) value. Fill the rest of the
components with zeros. Then, a sample from the probability that the best team (regarded as
the “offense”) scores is calculated by P(“offense” scores) = logit(x(t)>β(t)) . A comparison of
best versus random, worst versus random or random versus random would proceed similarly
where the random sampling is without replacement.
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Figure 7 shows the results of these matchups, where the distribution of posterior prob-
abilities that the offense scores are smoothed using a kernel density. It is reassuring to see
that offense lines consisting of the best players have a very high probability of scoring on the
worst players and with very low variance. This is indicative of a strong signal distinguishing
good from bad players in the data. Likewise, it is not surprising that the random players
outscore their random counterparts about half the time, and with high uncertainty. What is
interesting is that the “best v. random” and “random v. worst” densities are not the same:
there is a small but clear indication in the posterior distribution that the worst players hurt
more than the best players help.
An extended analysis incorporating salary information paints are more provocative pic-
ture. We now construct our line match-ups subject to a salary budget/cap B, by solving the
following binary program:
max
x∈{0,1}np
x>β(t),
subject to x>s ≤ B (4)
and x>g = 1, x>` = 1, x>r = 1, x>d = 2,
where s is an np-vector of player salaries, and (g, c, l, r, d) are np-vectors of binary indica-
tors for goalies, centers, wingers and defensemen, respectively, so that player positions are
still respected. The argument of each solution x(t) obtained from the binary program is
then mapped to a posterior sample of the player effects β(t), which gives us the posterior
probability logit(x(t)>β(t)) that the line scores against a random opponent.
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Figure 8: The left panel shows kernel density plots of the probability that an optimally chosen line scores
against a random line according to the full posterior distribution of β and under several salary caps; the
right panel shows the means and 90% predictive intervals of the same posterior as a function of those caps.
The left panel of Figure 8 shows the distribution of the probability the offense scores
for several values of B spanning from $2.6 million (0.26 × the current maximum salary of
$10 million)4 to $15 million. The right panel shows the posterior means and 90% credible
intervals for the probability that the offense scores as a function of the budget. The first
observation is that there is tremendous value amongst the cheapest players. Lines can be
formed among the cheapest players which still outscore their (random) opponents 65% of
the time, on average. Importantly, the posterior probability that this quantity is bigger than
50% (i.e., that the best low paid players are better than random ones) is 0.98. A second
observation is that lines formed without the most expensive players, i.e., with a budget less
than ($10M), are only marginally worse than those which have these most expensive players.
This means that the most expensive players may not be good value for money, at least as
far as scoring goals.5 Having the capacity to have two of the most expensive players on the
ice at once (e.g., Crosby and Malkin for the Penguins) seems to offer no advantage at all.
Inspecting the individual players that are involved in these optimal lines in each budget
category is also revealing. Brian Boucher, a goalie for the Flyers, is extremely valuable for
the money, costing just $92.5K. He is the most frequently selected player for each of the four
lowest budgets ($2.6-3.5M). Al Montoya ($750K) is in the top five of choices in all budgets
above the lowest four, representing a cheap but solid filler player that allows more budget to
be allocated to expensive stars. At very the top end, Pavel Datsyuk ($6.7M) is unsurprising
good value for the top three budgets ($10-15M). Ovechkin comes in at a respectable 20th
place among all players despite his high cost ($9M). Crosby (also $9M) comes in the top 25%.
The most expensive players, Lecavalier and Luongo, are not selected often at all, suggesting
4This is the lowest possible budget from which lines can be formed satisfying (4).
5Sweater sales is another matter.
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that money is better spent on cheaper (and younger) talent.
5 Discussion
In this paper, we use a logistic regression model to estimate the effects of individual players
on goal scoring in hockey. Unlike the traditional plus-minus measure that is commonly used,
our player effects account for the match-ups involved in each goal as well as overall team
contributions.
We take a Bayesian approach with a prior distribution that shrinks the coefficients to-
wards zero, which promotes stability in our model and protects against over-fit. The Laplace
prior distribution placed on the individual player coefficients allows us to perform variable
selection on the large scale needed for this data situation. With this variable selection, we
are able to separate out a small subset of players that show substantially above-average
performance.
Our analysis gives some surprising results, such as the dominance of Pavel Datsyuk over
other star players such as Sidney Crosby and Alex Ovechkin. We also find that several
prominent players, such as Evgeni Malkin, do not have significant player effects.
The point estimates βˆ and samples from the full posterior distribution offer insight into
relative player ability at a resolution not previously available. Such partial effects and
pairwise comparisons are new metrics derived from making better use of the same data
source behind plus-minus, obtained by leveraging newfound computational tractability in
high dimensional logistic regression modeling. We show in our appendix that it is possible
to entertain player–player interaction effects too, although ultimately conclude that these
offer little further insight.
By introducing outside data sources, such as player salary information and constraints
thereon (i.e., salary budgets), our approach offers unprecedented potential for exploratory
analysis, tinkering, and ultimately decision making by coaches, general managers, and fan-
tasy players alike. This analysis of match-ups would only be possible with our fully Bayesian
approach that accounts for the covariance between individual player effects by using samples
from the joint posterior distribution.
A more believable model for the combination of shift timings and goals would be to treat
every game as a Poisson point process, where each goal is a point-event and the expected
time between goals depends upon who is on the ice. However, such an approach requires
restrictive modeling assumptions and considerably more computation, and we doubt that
the value of information about when goals were not scored is worth the added complexity.
The popularity of traditional plus-minus is informative: player ability can be measured from
the subset of events that actually lead to goals. Thus while not completely discounting the
potential of time-dependent modeling, we present the work herein as a robust analysis that
is replicable, extensible, and based upon easily available data. Similarly, we have not used
power play or short-handed goals in our analysis, but extending our model to non-even-
strength situations is a promising direction for future work.
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Appendix
A Estimation Details and Software
Although L1 penalty methods and their Bayesian interpretation have been known for some
time, it is only recently that joint penalty–coefficient posterior computation and simulation
methods have become available for datasets of the size encountered here.
Probably the most well-known publicly available library for L1 penalty inference in lo-
gistic regression is the glmnet package (Friedman et al., 2010) for R. Conditional on a single
shared value of λ, this implementation estimates a sparse set of coefficients. A convenient
wrapper routine called cv.glmnet allows one to chose λ by cross-validation (CV). Unfor-
tunately, CV works poorly in our setting of large, sparse, and imbalanced XP , where each
model fit is relatively expensive and there is often little overlap between nonzero covariates
in the training and validation sets. Moreover, when maximizing (rather than sampling from)
the posterior, a single shared λ penalty leads to over-shrinkage of significant βj as penalty
choice is dominated by a large number of spurious predictors. But use of CV to choose
unique λj for each covariate would imply an impossibly large search.
Instead, we propose two approaches, both accompanied by publicly available software in
packages for R: joint MAP inference with textir, and posterior simulation with reglogit.
A.1 Fast variable selection and MAP inference with textir
Taddy (2013) proposes a gamma-lasso framework for MAP estimation in logistic regression,
wherein coefficients and their independent L1 penalties are inferred under a conjugate gamma
hyperprior. An efficient coordinate descent algorithm is derived, including conditions for
global convergence, and the resulting estimation is shown in Taddy (2013) as superior, in
both predictive performance and computation time, to the more common strategy of CV
lasso estimation under a single shared λ (as in glmnet). Results in this paper were all
obtained using the publicly available textir package for R (Taddy, 2012), which uses the
slam (Hornik et al., 2011) package’s simple-triplet matrices to take advantage of design
sparsity.
Prior specification in the gamma-lasso attaches independent gamma G(λj; s, r) hyperpri-
ors on each L1 penalty, with E[λj] = s/r and var[λ] = s/r
2, such that, for j = 1 . . . p,
pi(βj, λj) = Laplace(βj;λj)G(λj; s, r) =
rs
2Γ(s)
λsje
−λj(|βj |+r), s, r, λj > 0. (5)
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Laplace priors are often motivated through estimation utility—the prior spike at zero cor-
responds to a preference for eliminating regressors from the model in absence of significant
evidence. Our hyperprior is motivated by complementary considerations: for strong signals
and large |βj|, expected λj shrinks in the joint distribution to reduce estimation bias.
This leads to the joint negative log posterior minimization objective
l(α,β) =
ng∑
i=1
log (1 + exp [−yi(x′Tiα+ x′Piβ)]) +
1
2σ2
30∑
t=1
α2t +
np∑
j=1
s log(1 + |βj|/r), (6)
where s, r > 0. We have set σ = 1 and r = 1/2 throughout Section 3. In choosing
s = E[λj]/2, we focus on the conditional prior standard deviation, SD(βj) =
√
2/λj, for the
coefficients. Hence our value of s = 7.5, for E[λj] = 15, implies expected SD(βj) ≈ 0.095.
To put this in context, exp[3 × 0.095] ≈ 1.33, implying that a single player increasing his
team’s for-vs-against odds by 1/3 is 3 deviations away from the prior mean.
As an illustration of the implementation, the following snippets show commands to run
our main team–player model (see ?mnlm for details). With X = cbind(XP,XT) as defined in
Section 2.1, the list of 30 ridge and np gamma-lasso penalties are specified
pen <- c(rep(data.frame(c(0,1)),30),rep(data.frame(c(7.5,.5)),ncol(XP)))
and the model is then fit
fit <- mnlm(counts=Y, covars=X, penalty=pen, normalize=FALSE)
where X is not normalized since this would up-weight players with little ice-time.
A.2 Full posterior inference via reglogit
Extending a well-known result by Holmes and Held (2006), Gramacy and Polson (2012)
showed that three sets of latent variables could be employed to obtain sample from the full
posterior distribution using a standard Gibbs strategy (Geman and Geman, 1984). The full
conditionals required for the Gibbs sampler are given below for the L1 and λj = λ case (note
that β includes α here for notational convenience).
β|z, τ 2, ω, λ ∼ Np(β˜, V ) β˜ = V (y.X)>Ω−1z, y.X ≡ diag(y)X
λ|β ∼ G
(
a+ p, b+
p∑
j=1
|βj|
)
V −1 = λ2Σ−1D−1τ + (y.X)
>Ω−1(y.X)
τ−2j ∼ Inv-Gauss(|λ/βj|, λ2), j = 1, . . . , p ≡ ncol(X)
zi|β, ωi, yi, ∼ N+
(
yix
>
i β, ωi
)
, i = 1, . . . , n ≡ length(y).
ωi|yi, λ ∼ See below i = 1, . . . , n
Note that N+ indicates the normal distribution truncated to the positive real line,
Dτ = diag(τ
2
1 , . . . , τ
2
p ) and Ω = diag(ω1, . . . , ωn). Holmes and Held (2006) give a rejec-
tion sampling algorithm for ωi|zi, however Gramacy and Polson (2012) argue that it is
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actually more efficient to draw ωi|yi, λ (i.e., marginalizing over zi) as follows. A proposal
ω′i =
∑K
k=1 2ψ
−1
k k, and k ∼ Exp(1) may be accepted with probability min{1, Ai} where
Ai = Φ{(−yix>i β)/
√
ω′i}/Φ{(−yix>i β)/
√
ωi}. Larger K improves the approximation, al-
though K = 100 usually suffices. Everything extends to the L2 case upon fixing τ 2j = 1.
Extending to separate λj is future work.
We use the implementation of this Gibbs sampler provided in the reglogit package
(Gramacy, 2012a) for R. For the λ prior we use the package defaults of a = 2 and b =
0.1 which are shared amongst several other fully Bayesian samplers for the ordinary linear
regression context (e.g., blasso in the monomvn package (Gramacy, 2012b)). Usage is similar
to that described for mnlm. To obtain T samples from the posterior, simply call:
bfit <- reglogit(T=T, y=Y, X=X, normalize=FALSE)
Estimating the full posterior distribution for β allows posterior means to be calculated,
as well as component-wise variances and correlations between βj’s. However, unlike MAP
estimates βˆ, none of the samples or the overall mean is sparse. Gramacy and Polson (2012)
show how their algorithm can be extended to calculate the MAP via simulation, but this
only provides sparse estimators in the limit.
Another option is to use the posterior mean for λ obtained by Gibbs sampling on the
entire covariate set, and use it as a guide in MAP estimation. Indeed, this is what is done
in Section 3, where mean of our shared λ from Gibbs sampling was considered when setting
setting priors for E[λj].
B Extension to player–player interactions
We explore the possibility of on-ice synergies or mismatches between players by adding
interaction terms into our model. The extension is easy to write down: simply add columns
to the design matrix that are row-wise products of unique pairs of columns in the original
XP . However, this implies substantial computational cost: see Gramacy and Polson (2012)
for examples of regularized logistic regression estimators that work well for estimating main
effects but break down in the presence of interaction terms.
There is a further representational problem in the context of our hockey application.
There are about 27K unique player pairs observed in the data. Combining these interaction
terms with the original np players, ng goals and thirty teams, we have a double-precision
data storage requirement of nearly a gigabyte. While this is not a storage issue for modern
desktops, it does lead to a computational bottleneck since temporary space required for the
linear algebra routines cannot fit in fast memory. Fortunately, our original design matrix has
a high degree of sparsity, which means that the interaction-expanded design matrix is even
more sparse, and the sparse capabilities of textir makes computation feasible. Inference
on the fully interaction-expanded design takes about 20 seconds on an Apple Mac Desktop.
All other methods we tried, including reglogit, failed in initialization stages.
While the computational feat is impressive, our results indicate little evidence of signif-
icant player interaction effects. Figure 9 shows results for estimation with E[λ = 15]: only
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Figure 9: Comparing (non-zero) main effects for team–player model to their values in the interaction-
expanded team–player model (dots) The lines point to the unexpanded estimates, and the x-axis is ordered
by the dots.
four non-zero interactions are found when augmenting the team–player model to include
player–player interaction terms.6 Importantly, there is a negligible effect of including these
interactions on the individual player effect estimates (which are our primary interest). The
only player with a visually detectable connecting line is Joe Thornton, and to see it you may
need a magnifying glass. We guess from the neighboring interaction term that his ability is
enhanced when Patrick Marleau is on the ice. The most interesting result from this analysis
involves the pairing of David Krejci and Dennis Wideman, which has a large negative inter-
action. One could caution Bruins coach Claude Julien against having this pair of players on
the ice at the same time.
Using reglogit to obtain samples from the full posterior distribution of the interaction-
expanded model is not feasible, but we can still glean some insight by sampling from the
posterior distribution for the simpler model with the original team-player design augmented
to include the four significant interactions found from our initial MAP analysis. Figure 10
compares pairwise abilities for the same three players used as examples in Figure 6. We
observe minimal changes to the estimates obtained under the original team–player design,
echoing the results from the MAP analysis. In total, we regard the ability to entertain
interactions as an attractive feature of our methodology, but it does not change how we view
the relative abilities of players.
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